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potential-hacking-voting-machines-epilogue.txt
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## Assets ##
## Script ##
## Sources ##
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/29/us_voting_machines_hacking/
http://gizmodo.com/personal-info-of-650-000-voters-discovered-on-poll-mach-1797438462
http://fortune.com/2017/07/31/defcon-hackers-us-voting-machines/
https://www.cnet.com/news/defcon-hackers-find-its-very-easy-to-break-voting-machines/
http://assets01.aws.connect.clarityelections.com/Assets/Training/RootPreview/Customers/FL_Broward/Library/Manuals/VST_DS200_and_Ivotronic_Manual.pdf
https://twitter.com/VotingVillageDC
https://www.wired.com/story/voting-machine-hackers-5-tips/
## Notes ##
2017 DefCon conference included "Voting Village" 30 voting machines from major creators (Diebold, Sequoia, WinVote) that were availble to be hacked
- some took apart physically and noted the vulnerabilites
- some were hacked wirelessly
- first few vulnerabilites found in first 90 minutes (all were new)
How'd they get them:
- bought on ebay
- purchased at government auctions
What were the issues:
- Some ran outdated software (including unpatched OpenSSL, Windows XP, Windows CE)
- MS03-026 vulnerability in WinXP, allowing infosec academic Carsten Schurmann to access the machine from his laptop using RDP. access would enable him to change the vote tally from anywhere
- OpenSSL bug CVE-2011-4109
- poorly secured wifi connectivity
- admin passwords available on Google
- unsecured SQL databases with unsanitized SQL inputs coming in
- Voting System Technician training manual online includes password and how to log in
Criticism:
- Some of the machines were not fully secured (the way the manufacturers direct them to be by county officials)
- Some of the hacks would have been detected and logged
- Some of the machines are no longer in use in elections (1 model was decomissioned all others still active)
Extra:
- a ExpressPoll-5000 electronic poll book (used to check voters in) from Tennessee hadn't been wiped before being sold and data from over 650,000 voters was still on the machine
- included name, address, birthday, political party, whether they voted absentee, whether they were asked to show id
- file was on a removable memory card, data was not incrypted or password protected
- If someone had access before election, could alter it to make it appear that people had already voted absentee which would prevent them from voting on election day
- Georgia special election 4 were stolen from poll managers truck when he stopped for groceries
- got a WinVote to RickRoll people
Evidence that election systems in 21 states were targeted by cyber attacks
- does not appear that any votes were changed
- unclear what (if any) data they were able to hack
Follow Up On:
- In one case study, the company found a poll worker in Virginia had hacked the machine so she could play Minesweeper on it.
Some safeguards:
- Govt certifies vendors/equipment
- Independent hardware/software evaluation
- Voter-verified paper audit trail
- Mandatory recounts (automatic audit of some fraction of precinct results)
- Parallel testing for proper behavior
- some mahcines pulled from service on election day and run in a simulated election
None of this includes back end attacks:
- hacking into voter databases to change/steal information (changes could delay someone's ability to checkin/vote)
- targeting specific employees with backend access using spear phishing attack (get them to click on a link in an email so you have access to the network)
Recommendations:
- Retire old/outdated voting machines
- known vulnerabilities should be patched
- all machines should have a paper trail for auditing
- Secure voter registration systems and voter databases against hacking attacks
- encrypt databases
- use proper passwords and ensure passwords are kept secret
- Require risk limiting audits for any precinct that uses electronic voting machines
- take random, representative samples of the paper trail and audit them for accuracy
- Adjust the rules of procurement and maintenance of election voting systems
- require continuous delivery/installation of security patches
- Improve training of polling station staff
- Election officials need to be able to handle cryptographic keys and to protect them in the face of social engineering and other hacking attacks
- Could be largely done by 1-day IT conference